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Contextualising non-profit governance: the influence of 
contextual factors on board characteristics and 
paradoxes 
 
(A paper to sub-theme 17 of the 19th European Group for Organizational Studies 
(EGOS) Colloquium, Copenhagen, July 2003) 
 
Chris Cornforth, Open University Business School, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 
6AA, UK. E-mail: c.j.cornforth@open.ac.uk 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The delivery of public services in the UK has changed radically in recent decades. 
Increasingly government has been withdrawing from the direct delivery of public 
services and programmes. Two related reforms have been at the heart of this process. 
The first has been the creation of an increasing number of devolved or quasi-
autonomous governmental organisations (quangos) to deliver public services and 
programmes. The second has been the introduction of market mechanisms into the 
provision of public services through splitting the ‘purchasers’ of services from the 
‘providers’, and introducing elements of competition through the contracting out of 
services to a mix of private companies, voluntary organisations and quangos. 
 
As the importance of quangos and non-profit organisations has grown, they have come 
under increased public scrutiny. Paralleling developments in the private sector, the 
governance of these organisations has been questioned in the light of various well-
publicised organisational failings. Serious concerns have been raised both about the 
effectiveness of the boards of these organisations and their democratic legitimacy. 
 
These concerns have led to renewed professional and academic interest in the 
governance of public and non-profit organisations and a growing literature. A criticism 
that can be levelled at much of the theorising about boards (both in for-profit and non-
profit organisations) is it’s generic nature. Often little or no account is taken of how 
contextual factors may influence or shape board characteristics and behaviour. This is 
not something that is unique to the study of boards; similar criticisms have been levelled 
at much recent research in the field of organisational behaviour (Mowday and Sutton, 
1993; Rousseau and Fried, 2001; John, 2001). This paper examines the findings from a 
number of recent studies of public and non-profit boards in the UK which highlight the 
importance of contextual factors, and considers their implications for theory and 
practice. 
 
The paper begins by presenting a conceptual framework which attempts to identify and 
group some of the main contextual influences on boards. It then describes how the 
institutional environment in which non-profit organisations operate in the UK has 
changed over the last decade. Against this background the paper reviews recent findings 
from empirical studies of non-profit boards in the UK. These studies throw light on how 
changes in public policy, the provision of public services and the regulatory 
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environment are influencing public and non-profit boards. Finally the paper briefly 
outlines the implications of these finding for both theory and practice. 
 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR CONTEXTUALISING PUBLIC AND NON-
PROFIT GOVERNANCE 
 
Boards can be thought of operating across the boundary of organisations (Middleton, 
1987). Boards must face two ways: outwards relating the organisation to the external 
institutional and social environment - ensuring a degree of external accountability and 
compliance with external regulations and standards, and inwards relating to the internal 
organisational environment - working with staff to provide supervision and direction. 
As a result boards are influenced by a subtle combination of external and organisational 
factors. Middleton (1987) in a review of the literature on the governance of non-profit 
organisations characterised it as predominantly focussed on the relationship between 
boards and the external environment. Predominantly boards were viewed as a means of 
controlling environmental uncertainties and as part of power elites. Ostrower and Stone 
(2001) trace how the literature has developed since then. Environmental concerns are no 
longer to the fore and boards have become a focus of interest in their own right. In 
particular there is a focus on board characteristics, roles and effectiveness, but in the 
process a decline in explicit attention to the impact of internal and external 
contingencies. In response they advocate a strategic contingencies perspective and 
develop a new ‘integrated’ conceptual framework to guide future research, which 
attempts to re-establish the importance of external and internal contingencies. They 
divide external contingencies in to ‘broad dimensions’, such as those concerning the 
legal and institutional environment, and ‘specific dimensions’ concerning the particular 
type of non-profit organisation, such as its field of activity, stakeholders and funding 
environment. Internal contingencies include the organisation’s age, size, phase of 
development and complexity.  
 
Various recent studies and reviews of non-profit governance in the UK through light on 
how some of these contextual factors influence board characteristics, strategy and 
various paradoxes or tensions they face. Figure 1 summarises some of the main 
contextual influences on the boards of public and non-profit organisations, which will 
be examined below. The summary is not meant to be exhaustive, nor does it attempt to 
show the often complex interaction between different factors. 
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Figure 1: Contextual Influences on Public and Non-Profit Boards (Developed from 
Ostrower and Stone, 2001) 
 
THE CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND ITS INFLUENCE 
ON BOARD COMPOSITION AND STRATEGY  
 
Government legislation and policy has both direct and indirect influences on the 
governance of public and non-profit organisations. As might be expected the direct 
impact of government legislation and policy is most apparent on the wide range of 
quasi-governmental organisations (quangos), such as health trusts, further education 
colleges and various government agencies. Since the 1970’s successive governments 
have intervened directly to create new quangos or modify existing ones, and to shape 
how they are governed, through specifying board size, composition, recruitment 
procedures and defining their roles. Although a common theme of these policies was 
trying to make boards more effective, which often equated with involving people form 
the private sector, there was a good deal of variation between sub-sectors. For example, 
the boards of hospital trusts were modelled on the board of private companies with 
executive and non-executive directors, whereas in the education field multi-stakeholder 
models were adopted, so school governing bodies included parents, staff, and local 
authority representatives. 
 
These changes have created new opportunities for boards to ‘recruit’ people with 
different expertise and experience, particularly from the commercial world, and to act 
more strategically. However, the proliferation of quangos and the widespread move to 
appointed, rather than elected boards, prompted widespread concern about a decline in 
democratic accountability (Skelcher, 1998; Robinson et al, 2000).  
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At the same time government policies have also constrained the nature of the strategic 
choices that the boards of quangos may exercise. Greer et al (2003) describe various 
quangos on a dependence autonomy continuum. The degree of constraint is perhaps 
most strong in areas such as the health service with a high degree of centrally 
determined priorities and targets. However, even here the picture is not black and white 
and there have been changes over time with the devolution of budgets, the increased 
emphasis on local health plans and the recent move to foundation hospitals (Ashburner, 
2003). 
  
At the opposite end of the spectrum we have voluntary organisations, which while 
independent of direct government intervention still have to operate in an environment 
often significantly shaped by government policy. The contracting out of public services 
has transformed the environment in which many service-providing voluntary 
organisations operate creating important new funding opportunities, while creating new 
challenges and constraints. According to Harris (2001) the move to contracting, 
pressures for greater accountability and the growth of systems of performance 
measurement in the delivery of public services is creating a more complex and 
demanding environment for the boards of many voluntary organisations. These 
increasing demands may be one of the reasons behind the increased difficulty of 
recruiting board members, particularly among smaller charities observed by Cornforth 
(2001a). Others have suggested that growth in dependence on government funding and 
the imposition of performance targets that often goes with it has constrained the ability 
of many voluntary organisations to criticise government policies or tailor services to 
meet local needs.  
 
Regulatory regimes also play an important part in shaping the way in which boards 
operate. Different sub-sectors, such as housing and further education, have their own 
regulatory bodies, and this is an important source of difference in the governance of 
different types of public and non-profit organisation. In the voluntary sector the main 
regulatory body is the Charity Commission. Under pressure from the public and 
government, the Charity Commission has taken a more active supervisory role. For 
example it has introduced new financial reporting requirements and establishing a small 
enforcement team to try to ensure charities comply with financial reporting 
requirements. In addition it continues to expand the range of guidance and advice it is 
able to offer charity trustees (Charity Commission, 2000). 
 
Harrow and Palmer (2003) discuss the development of new accounting regulations for 
charities and in particular the requirements for charities with an income greater than 
£250k to carry out risk assessment. They suggest that pressures such as these are likely 
to make charity boards more risk averse and reinforce a compliance model of the 
board’s role. In a similar vein Locke et al (2003) discuss how charity law and its 
interpretation by the Charity Commission have constrained the development of user 
involvement on boards. 
 
However, even in the face of these regulatory pressures it is important to realise boards 
are able to exercise some choice. Harrow and Palmer (2003) illustrate this by noting the 
relatively high levels of non-compliance with financial regulations among small 
charities. Whether this was through deliberate choice or ignorance is difficult to say. 
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The process of influence may also be two way. Organisations may seek to change or 
influence the regulatory system. As Locke et al (2003) discuss it was pressure by 
various disability charities and self-help groups that helped to influence the Charity 
Commission to gradually allow greater degrees of user involvement on boards. 
 
The legal and regulatory environment in which boards operate does not exist in isolation 
but is shaped by wider social and political forces, which may also impact more directly 
on boards. It was public and political concern over declining standards in public life in 
the UK that lead to the establishment of the Nolan Committee. Its recommendations on 
local public spending bodies had an important impact on setting standards and codes of 
practice for the governance of many quangos, and an indirect influence further afield in 
the voluntary sector (Nolan, 1996). Subsequently, as Greer et al (2003) note, it was 
continuing public and political concerns over politically motivated public appointments 
that led the New Labour government to introduce more open and accountable systems 
of appointment for some quangos. 
 
It was a perceived decline in the public trust of charities, heightened by some well-
publicised failures that increased pressure on government and the Charity Commission 
to strengthen the regulation of charities. More directly, as mentioned above, it was 
campaigns by groups such and the as the disability rights movement that led to greater 
acceptance of user involvement on the boards’ of charities. 
 
INFLUENCES ON THE PARADOXES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Existing theories of corporate governance such as agency theory, stewardship theory, 
resource dependency theory or managerial hegemony have been criticised for being 
rather one-dimensional and emphasising particular roles of boards rather than the whole 
picture (Hung, 1998; Tricker, 2000; Cornforth, 2003). Cornforth (2003) argues the case 
for adopting a multi-paradigm perspective, which uses these theories to highlight 
various paradoxes or tensions that boards face. These paradoxes and tensions concern: 
who governs and the tension between having expert and representative boards; the 
boards role and the tension between driving forward performance and ensuring 
managerial and legal compliance; the boards relationship with management and the 
tension between supporting and controlling managerial actions. Below we review 
various studies which reveal how these paradoxes manifest themselves and are shaped 
by contextual factors, and consider some of the ways in which they can be managed. 
 
Who governs – the tension between representative and professional boards 
 
‘But there is, and will continue to be, a tension between the management driven and 
output related approach which is central to many recent changes, and the need for 
organisations providing public services to involve, respond to, and reflect the 
concerns of the communities which they serve.’ (Nolan, 1996) 
 
In many public and non-profit organisations there has been a strong tradition that those 
who govern them and sit on their board should represent the communities the 
organisation serves. Two different mechanisms have been used to achieve this end, 
direct elections of board members from a defined constituency, or through giving key 
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stakeholders the right to appoint members to the board. Over the last two decades, due 
in part to changes in public policy mentioned above, there has been a shift in emphasis 
towards a more business-like or managerial approach to governance with its stress on 
efficiency and effectiveness, and the competencies that board members need to fulfil 
their role effectively. This highlights an important tension: should board members be 
‘chosen’ because of their competence and expertise, or as representatives of particular 
groups?  
 
This paradox has been most apparent at a policy level with regard to the governance of 
quangos. Skelcher (1998) and Greer et al (2003) chart the increasing use of non-elected 
bodies such as quangos, non-profits and the private sector to deliver public services, and 
the decline in democratic accountability. Similarly Robinson and Shaw (2000) examine 
in detail these changes at a regional level and note the move from local government to 
more complex patterns of local governance, involving a range of elected and non-
elected bodies. Implicit in the public reforms of the various Conservative governments 
during the 1980’s and early 1990’s was the assumption that democratic forms of 
organisational governance were inherently ineffective and inefficient. As a result there 
was move to appointed boards and an explicit attempt to get more business people onto 
the boards of a range of quangos. 
 
Since the late 1990’s the pendulum has swung back, at least a little way, as calls for 
more open and accountable governing bodies became ever more strident. However, as 
Robinson and Shaw (2003) note, the move to more open and transparent board 
recruitment processes has been uneven and there is a good deal of variation between 
different sub-sectors, for example between health, education, economic development 
and housing. They also argue that it is still quite difficult to even find out who serves on 
the boards of many types of quango. Serious doubts remain about the ability of many 
quango boards to adequately ensure local democratic accountability. 
 
How then, can the paradox between effectiveness and accountability, and between 
expert and representative boards better be managed. Greer et al (2003) suggest one step 
might be to reframe the problem in terms of board legitimacy. They argue that board 
legitimacy is a product of both board effectiveness and democratic accountability. They 
suggest that a board that fails on either of these fronts is likely to be perceived as 
lacking legitimacy. They suggest that no one model of governance is likely to meet the 
needs of the diverse quango sector and call for more experimentation combining 
different forms of three types of representation: political representation, stakeholder 
representation and what they call the representation of characteristics, for example 
gender. 
 
There is perhaps a danger that too much is expected of boards alone. As Robson, Locke 
and colleagues note boards are not the only way, and may often not be the best way, of 
trying to achieve greater user involvement (Robson et al, 1997; Locke et al, 2003). 
Similarly, as Greer et al discuss boards are not the only way of achieving greater 
democratic accountability. Greater transparency and openness, external audit and 
evaluation, the development of new forums for consultation, improving the responsive 
of services to user needs can all increase local accountability. 
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The other side of the coin is that much can be done to try to ensure that ‘elected’ or ‘lay’ 
boards are effective. There has been a large increase in the availability of training, 
support and advice for board members in public and non-profit organisations, although 
there are large variations between different sectors, fields and areas. In some fields, such 
as education, external training is widely available to new board members. In others such 
as large parts of the voluntary sector provision is much patchier. 
 
Organisations themselves also have various options to help improve board 
effectiveness. For example, Grant (2003) examines how some traditional women’s 
organisations with large, representative governance structures have streamlined and 
reduced the size of their boards to make them more effective. Co-options and external 
advisers can be used to ensure that boards have access to areas of expertise they maybe 
missing (Cornforth and Edwards, 1998: 29-34). Chairs and chief executives can also try 
to ensure that their board members have opportunities to develop both individually and 
as a team. For example ensuring new board members have access to relevant induction 
and support, and that board members and senior managers have regular opportunities to 
reflect on the board’s role and performance. 
 
The boards role - the tension between performance and conformance 
 
Boards face a paradox in having to carry out contrasting roles that require very different 
orientations, skills and behaviour. The ‘conformance or compliance’ role requires 
attention to detail, the exercise of care, and skills in monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting. In contrast the ‘performance’ role demands forward vision, strategic thinking 
and risk-taking, and requires boards to be more proactive. 
 
Various studies suggest how this paradox is likely to be shaped by contextual factors. 
Harrow and Palmer (2003) argue that the new financial reporting regulations on 
charities and the more active role played by the charity regulator the Charity 
Commission is likely to make charity boards give precedence to the conformance role 
and make trustees more risk averse, although detailed empirical evidence to support this 
view is not yet available. Interestingly Otto’s (2003) comparative study of relations 
between board chairs and chief executives in different sectors suggests that board chairs 
in the voluntary sector tend to play a more limited and reactive role than their 
counterparts in other sectors. However, she explains this more in terms of other sectoral 
differences, rather than pressures from the regulator. She suggests this is due to 
voluntary sector chairs trying to keep control over their work and avoid conflict with 
chief executives given the voluntary nature of their role and hence the strict constraints 
on their time, the greater difficulties they experienced resolving ambiguities over the 
allocation of responsibilities and the perception that managers are the key actors in 
voluntary organisations. 
 
In the public sector the conflicting pressures arising from government policy often 
heighten this paradox. On the one hand public organisations are expected by 
government to be innovative and entrepreneurial, and on the other hand they are often 
subject to centrally imposed initiatives, performance targets and close monitoring and 
audit, which effectively constrain their opportunities for strategic choice. This dilemma 
was illustrated by the case studies of the school and FE college discussed by Cornforth 
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and Edwards (1998, 1999), where the boards felt that the number of Government 
initiatives and requirements imposed on them severely constrained both the time they 
could devote to strategic issues and their freedom of action. 
 
In contrast, Ashburner (2003) in her review of reforms of governance structures in the 
NHS suggests that the move to a ‘private sector’ model means that boards are too 
involved with ‘performance’ at the expense of their ‘conformance’ role. She suggests 
that the close involvement of non-executive board members with executives in 
formulating strategy and other management issues may mean that the ability of non-
executives to carry out their ‘conformance’ role will be compromised, because they lack 
the necessary independence to adequately scrutinise, evaluate and challenge 
management’s proposals. The counter argument is that if non-executives are only 
involved in evaluating proposals they make lack an understanding of the thinking 
behind the proposals, which makes them difficult to judge. Equally, it is a big step for a 
board to seriously challenge or reject management’s proposals and many boards may 
feel unwilling to take this step except in exceptional circumstances. As a result boards 
may be able to exert more influence by being involved in strategy formulation at an 
earlier stage so they can help shape proposals. This dilemma again reflects the difficult 
balancing act boards have to perform. 
 
How can boards manage this tension between their conformance and performance roles, 
so that issues of long term or strategic importance do not get squeezed off the board’s 
agenda, while at the same time the boards’ capacity for independent scrutiny is not 
compromised? Edwards and Cornforth (2003) suggest a number of important factors 
that enabled some of the boards they studied to have greater involvement in strategy 
making, a key aspect of the performance role, without compromising their conformance 
role. The attitudes and experience of board members themselves was important, which 
in turn could be shaped by board selection processes, board training and by the attitudes 
of managers to their boards. Also important were board processes. It was necessary to 
manage board agendas so important, longer-term issues were given priority. In some 
organisations long detailed agendas meant that a process of operational drift occurred, 
where boards became bogged down in operational detail leaving insufficient time for 
longer-term strategic issues. Some of the more successful organisations regularly set 
aside special meetings where routine board matters were set aside to focus on strategy.  
This was also an important means of managing the tension that can arise from carrying 
out very different roles at the same time. Garratt (1996) advocates a board cycle where 
different aspects of the board role are to some degree separated out over time in an 
annual cycle of board meetings. 
 
Relations with management - the tension between controlling and partnering  
 
A paradox perspective suggests that a simple dichotomy between boards controlling or 
partnering management is too simplistic. Different forms of behaviour will be 
appropriate at different times in the relationship. In a similar vein Kramer (1985) 
suggests that the board relationship with management is constantly shifting between 
consensus, difference and dissensus depending on the issues being faced and the 
circumstances. The question is more one of balance and how to manage the inevitable 
tensions that can arise in such complex relationships. 
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Various authors have examined how broader contextual factors may shape and constrain 
this relationship in the UK, however, supporting empirical evidence is patchy. Again the 
studies point to considerable variation between particular sub-sectors. As discussed 
above, Ashburner (2003) argues that changes in NHS boards are likely to shift the 
balance of the relationship too much towards a comfy partnership between senior 
managers and external directors. In contrast Harrow and Palmer (2003) are concerned 
that the increasing regulation of the charitable sector, with its emphasis on compliance 
and the control of risk, may undermine trust between boards and managers and lead 
boards to closer control and monitoring of management. 
 
Mole (2003) gives some insight into the relationship between chief executives (CEs) 
and boards from the CEs’ perspective. Interestingly in this career history research only 
just over half the sample of CEs mentioned their boards when discussing key factors 
that supported or acted as barriers to achieving their work. This may suggest that boards 
are less important in the life of many CEs and the work of their organisation than is 
sometimes supposed. Of those that did mention their boards about two thirds raised 
problematic issues. The range of issues discussed and the variety of views expressed 
illustrates the complexity of board CE relations. From the CEs perspective the issue 
mentioned most frequently concerned the level of support they received from their 
boards, both as a positive factor and as a negative factor when it was absent or felt not 
to be of the right sort. 
 
Bieber (2003) examines issue of power and control between boards and directors (chief 
executives) in independent museums. His case study research shows the central role 
chief executives play in shaping what boards do, through setting agendas, deciding how 
issues are presented to the board and controlling information. He also shows how 
museum directors used their professional status to keep control of issues concerned with 
the museums’ collections. While not quite a rubber stamp, most items at board meetings 
were agreed and only very few were deferred, amended or rejected and there was 
relatively little board debate. However, Bieber notes that board chairs played a key role 
in mediating the relationship between the board and director. He suggests that the 
boards seem to have entrusted their chairs to establish a relationship with the directors 
and to oversee their work. Hence a board’s support for its director was at least partially 
conditional on the chair’s support. The relatively passive role of the boards may also 
reflect the balance of power in what Lorsch and MacIver (1989) call ‘normal’ times, 
when things are going well. They suggest it is usually in crises that the board becomes 
much more active. 
 
Otto (2003) examines this important relationship between chairs and CEs in more detail. 
Her comparative research suggests that the chairs of voluntary organisations may be less 
proactive than their counterparts in the private sector and the relationship with CEs may 
be less conflictual than those in the public sector. Otto suggests that this more limited 
involvement may stem from the voluntary nature of the chair role and the absence of a 
clear statutorily prescribed role. It was a way in which the chairs of voluntary 
organisations could keep control of the time they committed to the job and also avoid or 
minimise conflict with chief executives. 
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However, the relationship between chairs and CEs may also be influenced by the type 
of voluntary organisation and the circumstances they face. Grant (2003) suggests not all 
chairs of voluntary organisations may be so reactive or careful to avoid conflict. In her 
analysis of the development of the women’s movement organisations she highlights the 
sometimes fraught relations between chairs and chief executives. The analysis suggests 
in organisations which are predominantly voluntary in nature, paid staff my lack 
legitimacy, and there may be competition between chairs and CEs for prestige and 
influence. 
 
How can the complex and paradoxical relationship between boards and senior managers 
and the resulting tensions best be managed? As Mole has pointed out tension and 
conflict seem most likely to occur when boards and senior managers have different 
expectations of their respective roles. The complex and interdependent nature of the 
roles offers plenty of scope for different interpretations. One way of trying to establish a 
productive working relationship is through explicit discussion and negotiation over 
roles and responsibilities. In previous case study research Cornforth and Edwards 
(1998) suggest that an important determinant of effective governance was that boards 
regular review their relationship with management and how they were working together. 
This was also confirmed in a later survey examining perceptions of what made boards 
effective (Cornforth, 2001b). Harris (1993), drawing on action research in small 
voluntary organisations, goes further and suggests the value of a technique called Total 
Activities Analysis where boards and staff systematically review the organisations main 
activities and examine who should play what part in carrying them out. 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANISATIONAL SIZE 
The organisational context in which boards operate also influences how they work. This 
is most clearly demonstrated with regard to organisational size. Cornforth and Simpson 
(2002) in their survey of charities show a clear association between organisational size 
and various board characteristics and changes. They show that larger charities tend to 
have larger more structured boards and provide more formal support for their members. 
The research also suggests that there is a growing gap between the boards of large and 
small charities, with larger organisations finding it easier to recruit board members and 
provide them with support. 
 
A weakness of quantitative studies like this is that they do not throw much light on how 
organisational size or related factors influence organisational governance. This is an 
issue taken up by Rochester (2003).  Using case study research he examines in detail 
some of the constraints that the boards of small voluntary organisations operate under. 
 
Rochester highlights the vulnerability of many small organisations dependent on a few 
key people to run the organisation and that are dependent on a single source of funds, 
which is subject to annual review and renegotiation. These constraints made certain 
board activities such as long term planning and taking a strategic perspective difficult. 
In addition the small size and the need to devote efforts to service provision often left 
the organisations isolated. In future research it may also be useful to view small size as 
a source of opportunities for boards, for example for board members to be in touch and 
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knowledgeable about the day-to-day work of the organisation, to be flexible and react 
quickly to events. 
 
Rochester suggests a number of factors that enabled the governance systems in some of 
these organisations to overcome the ‘liability of smallness’. He suggests that the 
blurring of the boundary between board and staff roles is more pronounced in small 
organisations, and that effective boards tended to share their work among many board 
and staff members rather than concentrate it in the hands of the few. These 
organisations are characterised by informality and successful leadership tends to be by 
example and involves nurturing and enabling rather than the use of formal authority. 
However, to be successful small voluntary organisations also need formal systems for 
board recruitment and to ensure board meeting were planned and conducted in an 
effective manner. So managing the tension between formality and informality was an 
important skill. Given their closeness to the day to day work of the organisation 
successful boards also needed to be able to balance their involvement in operational 
matters with the need to periodically take a longer term more strategic view. 
 
CONCLUSION: NEW THEORY TO ENCOURAGE THE REFLEXIVE BOARD 
 
An important motivation for this paper was the limitations of current academic theories 
of boards as a way of understanding boards or as a guide to action. Each of the main 
theories tends to give pre-eminence to one particular role of boards. They ignore the 
multiple and sometimes conflicting roles that boards play and the way these may shift 
over time in response to changing circumstances. Against this background the paper 
drew upon recent studies of public and non-profit boards in the UK to examine how 
contextual factors help shape board composition, strategy and various board paradoxes. 
 
The paper has shown how the changing institutional and regulatory environment has 
influenced a range of public and non-profit boards.  A number of common trends were 
identified, such as the greater use of practices and ideas from the private sector, and the 
greater involvement of private sector managers and professionals on the boards of 
quangos and non-profit organisations. However, it is important to note these changing 
were not uniform across the sectors and there was a good deal of variation between 
different sub-sectors, often stemming at least in part from differences in public policy 
and different patterns of regulation. In addition theories of organisational governance 
have also tended to ignore the influences of organisational differences on boards. In 
contrast this paper highlighted the importance of organisational size, and suggested that 
the boards of small non-profits organisations face a number of distinctive problems and 
issues.  
 
The boards of non-profit organisations and quangos face new challenges. There are 
increased pressures for improved performance and accountability. Public and non-profit 
organisations are increasingly subjected to scrutiny by the media, and failings quickly 
pointed out (Gibelman and Gelman, 2000). At the same time public and political 
concern over the performance of many types of organisations has grown and in response 
regulatory regimes have been tightened. Many funders are requiring organisations to 
specify performance targets and put in place systems to monitor and report on their 
performance. As the demands on boards is increasing there are growing problems of 
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recruitment, and many board members report lack of time or concern over their 
responsibilities as the main constraint on their involvement. 
 
How can boards deal in a realistic way with these new circumstances and the difficult 
and often ambiguous roles they have to carry out? Relying on how things have been 
done previously or simple prescriptions by themselves is unlikely to be adequate. 
Boards need to become more reflexive - to develop a capacity to regularly review their 
composition, board performance, how they work with management and how they 
manage various tensions in the light of changing circumstances. The reflexive board 
will need to give a high priority to its own maintenance and development. Unfortunately 
under pressure of time this is a function that often gets neglected. 
 
Boards also need new conceptual tools to help them reflect on and understand the 
complex challenges they face. The implications for researchers on organisational 
governance are clear; we need to be developing new theories or models that take much 
more account of the inter-relationships between boards and the contexts in which they 
operate. Hopefully, the paradox perspective presented in this paper provides one useful 
framework for enabling boards to think about their different roles and the difficult 
tensions and ambiguities they face. Rather than search for the right board model or 
approach, boards need to try to find the right balance between the different ‘pulls’ 
created by the paradoxes given the circumstances they face. Board dysfunctions or 
problems usually occur when boards become attracted to one ‘pole’ and are no longer 
able to maintain a ‘balance’, for example when boards trust and support management so 
much that they forget to scrutinise their proposals and ask the hard questions, or become 
so involved in monitoring what management does and operational detail that they forget 
the big picture and neglect the organisation’s strategy. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ashburner, L (2003) ‘The Impact of Governance Structures on the NHS’ in Cornforth, 
C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? 
London: Routledge. 
 
Beiber, M. (2003) ‘Governing Independent Museums: How Trustees and Directors 
Exercise Their Power’ in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit 
Organisations: What Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Charity Commission (2000) Annual Report 1999 – 2000, London: The Stationary 
Office. 
 
Cornforth, C. (1995) ‘Governing Non-profit Organizations: Heroic Myths and Human 
Tales’, Researching the UK Voluntary Sector: Conference Proceedings, London: 
National Council of Voluntary Organisations. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2001a) Recent trends in charity governance and trusteeship: the results 
of a survey of governing bodies of charities, London: National Council of Voluntary 
Organisations. 
 
EGOS_2003_paper/02/04/09 13 
Cornforth, C. (2001b) 'What makes boards effective? An examination of the 
relationships between board inputs, structures, processes and effectiveness in non-profit 
organisations', Corporate Governance: An International Review 9, 3, 217-227. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2003) ‘Introduction: the Changing Context of Governance – Emerging 
Issues and Paradoxes’, in Cornforth, C. (Ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit 
Organisations: What Do Boards Do?, London: Routledge. 
 
Cornforth, C. and Edwards, C. (1998) Good Governance: Developing Effective Board-
Management Relations in Public and Voluntary Organisations, London: CIMA 
Publishing. 
 
Cornforth, C. and Edwards, C. (1999) ‘Board Roles in the Strategic Management of 
Non-profit Organisations: Theory and Practice’, Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 7, 4, 346-362. 
Cornforth, C. and Simpson, C. (2002), 'Change and continuity in the governance of non-
profit organisations in the U.K: the Impact of Organizational Size' Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 12, 4, 451-470. 
 
Edwards, C. and Cornforth, C. (2003) ‘What Influences the Strategic Contribution of 
Boards? in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: 
What Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Garratt, B. (1996) ‘The Fish Rots from the Head – the Crisis in our Boardrooms: 
Developing the Crucial Skills of the Competent Director’, London: Harper Collins Pubs. 
 
Gibelman, M. and Gelman, S. R. (2000) ‘Very Public Scandals: An Analysis of How 
and Why Nongovernmental Organizations Get in Trouble’, a paper presented at the 
International Society for Third Sector Research conference, Trinity College, Dublin, 
July 2000. 
 
Grant, J. (2003) ‘The Changing Face of Governance in Women’s Organisations’ in 
Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do 
Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Greer, A., Hoggett, P. and Maile, S. (2003) ‘Quasi-governmental Organisations – 
Effective and Accountable?’ in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-
profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Harris, M. (1993) ‘Exploring the Role of Boards Using Total Activities Analysis’, 
Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 3, 3, 269-281. 
 
Harris, M. (2001) ‘Boards: Just Subsidiaries of the State?’ in M. Harris and C. 
Rochester (eds.) Voluntary Organisations and Social Policy in Britain: Perspectives on 
Change and Choice, London: Palgrave. 
 
EGOS_2003_paper/02/04/09 14 
Harrow, J. and Palmer, P. (2003) ‘The Financial Role of Charity Boards’, in Cornforth, 
C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? 
London: Routledge. 
 
Herman, R. D. (1989) ‘Concluding Thoughts on Closing the Board Gap’ in Herman, R. 
and Van Til, J. (eds.) Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Analyses and Applications, New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books. 
 
Hung, H. (1998) ‘A typology or theories of the roles of governing boards’, Corporate 
Governance, 6, 2, 101-111. 
 
John, G. (2001) ‘In Praise of Context’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 31-42. 
 
Kramer, R. (1985) ‘ Towards a Contingency Model of Board-Executive Relations’, 
Administration in Social Work, 9, 3, 15-33. 
 
Locke, M., Begum, N. and Robson, P. (2003) ‘Service Users and Charity Governance’ 
in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What 
Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Lorsch, J. W. and MacIver, E. (1989) Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s 
Corporate Boards, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Middleton, M. (1987) ‘Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond the Governance 
Function’, in W. Powell (ed.) The Nonprofit sector: A Research Handbook, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Mole, V. (2003) ‘What are Chief Executives’ Expectations and Experiences of their 
Boards?’ in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit 
Organisations: What Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Mowday, R. T. and Sutton, R. I. (1993) ‘Organizational Behavior: Linking Individuals 
and Groups to Organizational Contexts’, Annual Review of Psychology, 44, 195-229. 
 
Nolan (1996) Second Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life: Local 
Spending Bodies, 1, London: HMSO. 
 
Ostrower, F. and Stone, M. M. (2001) ‘Governance Research: Trends, Gaps and 
Prospects for the Future’. Paper presented to the ARNOVA Annual Conference, 
November 29 – December 1st, Miami, Florida. 
 
Otto, S. (2003) ‘Not So Very Different: A Comparison of the Roles of Chairs of 
Governing Bodies and Managers in Different Sectors’ in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The 
Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? London: 
Routledge. 
 
EGOS_2003_paper/02/04/09 15 
Robinson, F., Shaw, K., Dutton, J., Grainger, P., Hopwood, B. and Williams, S. (2000) 
Who Runs the North East…Now? Durham: University of Durham, Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy. Available on www.dur.ac.uk/Sociology/nedemocracy. 
 
Robinson, F. and Shaw, K. (2003) ‘Who Governs North East England? A Regional 
Perspective on Governance’ in Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-
profit Organisations: What Do Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Robson, P., Locke, M. and Devenney, M. (1998) Consumerism or Democracy? User 
Involvement in the Control of Voluntary Organisations, Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Rochester, C. (2003) ‘The Role of Boards in Small Voluntary Organisations’ in 
Cornforth, C. (ed.) The Governance of Public and Non-profit Organisations: What Do 
Boards Do? London: Routledge. 
 
Rousseau, D. M. and Fried, Y. (2001) ‘Location, Location, Location: Contextualizing 
Organizational Research’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 1-13. 
 
Skelcher, C. (1998) The Appointed State: quasi-governmental organisations and 
democracy, Buckingham, Open University Press. 
 
Tricker, B. (2000) 'Editorial - Corporate Governance - the subject whose time has 
come', Corporate Governance, 8, 4, 289-296. 
 
 
